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 THE FICTIVE 
ORIGINS OF 
SECULAR 
HUMANISM 
 Justin Neuman 
 The Enchantress of Florence by 
Salman Rushdie. New York: 
Random House, 2008. Pp. 368. 
$26.00 cloth. 
 Shortly before the novel’s release in 
the United States, the Sunday edi-
tion of the  New York Times hailed 
Salman Rushdie’s  The Enchantress 
of Florence as a work of serious lit-
erary ambition destined to draw 
critical and popular attention back 
to Rushdie’s prose and away from 
the political and personal imbroglios 
that have overshadowed his fi ction 
since 1989. As of yet, this has not 
been the case; early reviews were 
mixed at best, and though it is unde-
niably a captivating and compulsively 
readable book,  The Enchantress of 
Florence eschews the signifi cant sty-
listic innovation and overt, high-
stakes cultural commentary that 
energizes Rushdie’s  The Satanic 
Verses (1988). Instead, Rushdie’s 
newest novel seeks sanctuary in the 
mirror of history—in this case, a 
mirror veiled in gauzy multicultur-
alist platitudes. Despite its preen-
ing,  The Enchantress of Florence 
proves an essential book; in its 
strongest moments,  The Enchant-
ress of Florence repudiates linear, 
Eurocentric histories of the Renais-
sance and conjures in their stead 
a synchronous world of parallel 
realities in which the seeds of secu-
lar humanism fl ower not once but 
twice—once in northern Italy and 
simultaneously in northern India. 
Read reparatively, Rushdie’s novel 
invites us to reconsider axiomatic 
tenets about modernity, secularism, 
and humanism—chief among them 
the relation between the ethos of 
modernity and the rejection of an 
enchanted world. 
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 In terms of genre,  The Enchant-
ress of Florence is a globe-traversing 
prose romance about the vicissitudes 
of love, power, and storytelling—a 
romance dressed in the guise of an 
impeccably researched historical 
novel (complete with an extensive 
bibliography). The book’s opening 
vignettes transport the reader, along 
with a golden-haired stranger, by 
bullock cart into Fatehpur Sikri, 
the city built by the Mughal emperor 
Akbar the Great in the sixteenth 
century. The stranger, who calls 
himself Mogor dell’Amore (the 
“Mogul of Love”) and whose real 
name is Niccolò Vespucci—cousin of 
Amerigo and namesake of Niccolò 
Machiavelli—has journeyed from 
his birthplace in the New World 
via Florence to Mughal Hindustan 
with a story he will reveal only to 
Emperor Akbar himself. Gaining 
entry to the Mughal court through 
a series of bold stratagems, feats 
of linguistic virtuosity, and magic 
tricks, Mogor dell’Amore garners 
the favor of Akbar and so begins 
the teasing, digressive weaving and 
unweaving of a story that captivates 
the emperor for longer than Sche-
herazade plied Shahryar with her 
tales in  The Arabian Nights. The 
story that emerges unites the lives of 
three Florentines (Niccolò Machia-
velli, Antonino Argalia, and Ago 
Vespucci) with Akbar’s dynasty by 
way of an intrepid princess named 
Qara Köz (“Lady Black Eyes”)—
the tragic heroine of Niccolò’s tale 
and the erstwhile enchantress of 
Florence. 
 Fictive and real, Florence and 
Hindustan, East and West evolve 
as parallel worlds—as “mirrors” of 
one another, to use one of the 
novel’s favorite metaphors. But so 
enthralled is the novel with sym-
metry, parallel, and simultaneity 
(“We are their dream . . . and they 
are ours,” as one character puts it) 
that  The Enchantress of Florence 
underplays points of contrast (48). 
Rushdie’s depiction of the birth 
of modernity in the budding secu-
lar humanisms of Florence and 
Mughal India severs the link—
common to Renaissance self-
understanding and to centuries of 
subsequent scholarship—between 
the rise of humanist sensibilities and 
the recovery of classical antiquity. 
 According to regnant narratives 
of the Enlightenment, in fourteenth-
century and fi fteenth-century Flor-
ence the pietistic, feudal social matrix 
of medieval Christianity deformed 
in the crucible of the city-state under 
the twin pressures of mercantile 
capitalism on the one hand and a 
revival of classical aesthetics on the 
other. Individualism, the emergence 
of linear temporality, and a power-
ful critique of Christianity depend 
in no small part on the scholarly 
methods of textual analysis, herme-
neutics, and archival research pio-
neered by Italian humanists in the 
fi fteenth century—all of which 
parallel a steady repudiation of the 
enchanted world of medieval Chris-
tendom. Not only can no equiva-
lent milieu of forces be found in 
Mughal India, Rushdie’s depiction 
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of Florence rejects the disenchant-
ment thesis wholesale, marginal-
izes classicism and capitalism, and 
devotes itself instead to the realpo-
litik of the Medici family and Flo-
rentine sexual libertinism. Indeed, 
though oblique references to the 
mercantilism and trade that fueled 
the rise of the Italian city-states reg-
ister in the interstices of the tale, 
trade (other than the trade of women) 
is equally distant from Rushdie’s 
evocation of humanism in Italy and 
Hindustan. 
 Nor is Rushdie’s point the one we 
might expect him to make; namely, 
that “renaissance” (as the rediscov-
ery of the science, philosophy, and 
aesthetics of antiquity and the 
rebirth of Europe) cannot describe 
an Islamic culture that never lost 
Hellenism in the fi rst place. Nor 
should  The Enchantress of Florence 
be read as a leap aboard the already-
crowded “multiple modernities” 
bandwagon—the striking thing 
about the way Rushdie portrays 
Sikri and Florence and the charac-
ters who inhabit them is how 
fundamentally similar they are in 
attitude, bodily comportment, belief, 
and ethos. As Akbar philosophizes, 
“ The curse of the human race is not 
that we are so different from one 
another, but that we are so alike ” (311, 
original italics). 
 Returning to the plot, Niccolò 
and Rushdie fi ll their tales with 
adventure, violence, and sex, all held 
in place by the  point de capiton 
of the historical record. In Nic-
colò’s tale, the Florentine Antonino 
Argalia journeys east, is captured 
by the Ottomans, becomes an 
invincible Janissary general, and 
captures Qara Köz and her mirror-
image slave girl (both of whom call 
themselves Angelica) after defeat-
ing the Persian shah (who had, in 
turn, won her from the Mughals in 
another battle). Returning trium-
phant to Florence after several 
decades, Argalia discovers how 
mutable titles like hero and traitor, 
enchantress and witch, can become 
in moments of political expedience. 
After Argalia dies protecting his 
love and her mirror, the women 
fl ee to the New World under Ago 
Vespucci’s protection in the fi nal 
phase of Qara Köz’s westward 
exile—a journey cast as a failed 
attempt to fi nd, like Columbus, a 
route to the East in the journey 
west. In a tangled genealogy that 
results in Niccolò insisting he is the 
emperor’s uncle (though Akbar is a 
much older man), Qara Köz turns 
out to be Akbar’s great aunt, a 
princess expunged from the 
Mughal historical record for the 
sin of casting her lot fi rst with the 
Persian king and then with his van-
quisher, Antonino Argalia, “the 
Turk.” 
 What then, we must ask, are the 
nature and status in  The Enchant-
ress of Florence of ideas like human-
ism and secularism, refracted as they 
are by Rushdie’s idiosyncratic rep-
resentation of Mughal Hindustan 
and Medici Florence? In several 
important ways, Rushdie’s novel 
conforms to mainline accounts of 
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secularization (as entailing the retreat 
of religion from public life paired 
with the decline of individual belief ) 
and of humanism (epitomized by a 
commitment to beauty as the ulti-
mate aesthetic value, a commitment 
paired with a recentering of life 
around worldly affairs and indi-
vidual reason). None of the princi-
pal characters of the novel believe 
in God, either Christian, Muslim, 
or otherwise. Instead, religions are 
an object of scholarly and compar-
ative interest: Akbar establishes a 
commission to “count and name . . . 
every worshiped divinity of Hin-
dustan, not only the celebrated, 
high gods, but all the low ones 
too” (139). Akbar, like the elite of 
Florence to whom he is compared, 
“trusted beauty, painting, and the 
wisdom of his forebearers. In other 
things, however, he was losing con-
fi dence; in, for example, religious 
faith” (57). 
 Refl ecting dominant theories of 
secularization, in  The Enchantress 
of Florence religions have lost their 
normative force but retain cultural 
infl uence on private life and social 
structure: as Akbar tells Niccolò, 
“[T]he austere religion of our father 
will always be ours, just as the car-
penter’s creed is yours” (139). The 
public sphere of Sikri is nominally 
secular in this simple sense. Com-
mitted to ending sectarian strife in 
Muslim-ruled Hindustan, Akbar 
fl irts with atheism: “ Maybe there was 
no true religion ,” muses the emperor, 
a man who “wanted to be able to tell 
someone of his suspicion that men 
had made their gods and not the 
other way around,” and who sus-
pects, moreover, that “it is man at 
the center of things, not God” (81, 
original italics). As he riffs expan-
sively on pre-Socratic relativism in 
the diction of Renaissance Europe, 
Akbar circles toward a more prop-
erly humanist ambition: to “have 
no other temples but those dedi-
cated to mankind . . . to found the 
religion of man” (81). 
 If a simultaneous but discon-
nected humanist ethos attracts 
Rushdie to the Mughal Empire and 
Florence in the late 1500s, the gene-
alogy, meaning, and effects of these 
humanist visions—and the nature 
of their relation to one another—
remain unclear. Divorced from 
mercantile capitalism and classicism, 
secular humanism stands, in  The 
Enchantress of Florence , on three 
equally precarious legs. The fi rst is, 
ironically, absolute rule: the hu-
manism of Akbar’s Mughal Empire 
depends on one charismatic auto-
crat’s pragmatic but hardly neces-
sary response to the demands of 
administering a multicultural and 
religiously diverse empire. An emer-
gent humanism is performed in his 
sovereign decrees, and it achieves 
its most lyrical evocations in his 
private meditations. Whereas both 
Christianity and Islam have wielded 
the sword of empire and offered 
transcendental justifi cation for the 
work and rhetoric of domination, 
Rushdie’s Akbar sees pluralism as 
an effective structural principle of 
enduring dominion. The novel’s 
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critiques of religion emerge from 
the relativizing power of this plural-
ism and from the distancing effect 
facilitated by a religiously diverse 
world whose fi gures travel exten-
sively. When Akbar queries his chief 
advisor, an observant Brahmin, 
looking for philosophical defenses 
of atheism, Birbal puts the case 
well: “All true believers have good 
reasons for disbelieving in every 
god except their own . . . and so it 
is they who, between them, give 
me all the reasons for believing in 
none” (44). 
 Conjuring Akbar’s fi ctional per-
sona offers Rushdie an opportunity 
to indulge his penchant for hyper-
bole and to showcase the charming 
side of megalomania: Akbar is “the 
Grand Mughal, the dusty, battle-
weary, victorious, pensive, incipi-
ently overweight, disenchanted, 
mustachioed, poetic, oversexed, and 
absolute emperor” (30). More impor-
tantly, he is a walking paradox: “As 
a boy he had killed a tigress with 
his bare hands and then, driven to 
distraction by his deed, had forever 
forsworn the eating of meat and 
become a vegetarian. A Muslim veg-
etarian, a warrior who wanted only 
peace, a philosopher-king: a con-
tradiction in terms. Such was the 
greatest ruler the land had ever 
known” (33). These contradictions, 
it seems, are enough to exceed the 
narrow confi nes of received religion 
and enact a poetics of hybridity that 
is the most recognizable trope of 
Rushdie’s fi ction across nine novels 
and three decades. 
 The second enabling condition for 
a humanist ethos in  The Enchant-
ress of Florence , and an important 
site of convergence between Med-
ici Florence and Akbar’s Sikri, 
is an ethos of decadence, sexual 
licentiousness, and a thriving pub-
lic culture of prostitution. While 
the autocratic, hierarchical nature 
of Akbar’s empire suggests that 
Mughal humanism is an epiphe-
nomenon of the sovereign imagi-
nation, positing the importance 
of physical pleasure as a necessary 
condition for an emergent secular 
humanism offers a more insightful 
and enduring commentary. In Rush-
die’s novel, courtesans and brothels 
are constitutive elements of the pub-
lic sphere. The parallel houses of 
Skanda and Mars in Sikri and Flor-
ence sustain unique salon cultures 
that generate a panoply of visual 
and literary art while offering sex-
ual permissiveness an alternative 
to what Rushdie calls “the stink of 
religious sanctimony” (146). Men in 
Rushdie’s Florence and Hindustan 
worship (and purchase) women—
indeed, much of the novel is devoted 
to these activities—who supplant 
religion and history as the source 
of inspiration for art and action. 
The misogynistic implications of 
Rushdie’s portrayal of women, a 
common refrain in the scholarly 
responses to his work, here achieve 
a fevered pitch; for a sexually desir-
able woman like Qara Köz, “poets 
reached for their pens, artists for 
their brushes, sculptors for their 
chisels”—which is to say “that when 
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you lay eyes on the pair of witches 
[Qara Köz and the mirror] the 
desire to fuck them comes upon you 
like swine fever” (275, 237). 
 Finally, and most importantly, 
secular humanism in the novel 
requires and refl ects a certain rela-
tionship to narrative we might call 
the “novelistic imagination.” The 
successful storyteller in  The Enchant-
ress of Florence “usurp[s]the prerog-
ative of the gods” in “the creation 
of a real life from a dream” (47). In 
this formula, not only does a novel-
istic imagination foster seculariza-
tion by substituting worldly stories 
for those of religion and divinity, 
the creative force of authorship casts 
man—and they are men in Rush-
die’s novel—in the place of God as 
creator and sustainer of the world. 
Humanism and secularism con-
verge within the compass of telling 
and hearing stories while the com-
munity of auditors describes the 
limits of public discourse just as 
surely as political hegemony. In 
asserting a link between modernity, 
secularism, humanism, and the 
novel, we are not yet beyond the 
pale of mainline theories of moder-
nity or secularism; indeed, genre 
theorists from Ian Watt, Michael 
McKeon, and James Wood to 
Bakhtin, Lukács, and de Sade agree 
that, in their historical origins and 
subsequent development, novels are 
agents of secularization. In nonfi c-
tion prose like the essay “Is Noth-
ing Sacred” in  Imaginary Homelands 
(1991), Rushdie espouses a simi-
lar view, calling literature “the 
schismatic Other of the sacred (and 
authorless) text,” but adding the 
important qualifi er that literature 
is “also the art most likely to fi ll our 
god-shaped holes” (424). 
 There is a fundamental, unad-
dressed tension at the heart of  The 
Enchantress of Florence —and indeed 
in much of Rushdie’s fi ction and 
prose—between his explicit and 
implicit endorsements of secular-
ism, humanism, and pluralism, on 
the one hand, and his equally per-
vasive argument for the power of 
fi ction on the other. In Rushdie’s 
work, fi ction and narrative are pow-
erful, transformative forces; narra-
tive is less a means of representing 
the world than a mode of appre-
hension, a metaphysical hammer 
he uses to smash certainties of cau-
sality, a forge of the alternate real. 
For Rushdie, fi ctions are the world 
entire. They are also bound to 
an enchanted mode of being and 
knowing—a mode they both require 
and sustain—explicitly at odds with 
regnant theories of secularism, 
modernity, and humanism. 
 In  The Enchantress of Florence , 
fi ctions are at once a kind of magic 
and the source of a more sustained 
ontological transformation. Sum-
moning the novel’s titular trope, 
fi ctions in  The Enchantress of Flor-
ence are powerful forms of enchant-
ment—and thus explicitly linked 
to nonsecular and potentially het-
erodox forms of religiosity from 
dark magic to paganism. From the 
citizens of Florence to Akbar and the 
denizens of Hindustan, Rushdie’s 
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characters are unabashed addicts of 
fantasy; they are credulous partici-
pants in a wide range of narrative 
phantasmagoria, particularly when 
they involve romance. In the most 
endearing and symptomatic of these 
fantasies, Akbar imagines a woman, 
gives her a name, Jodha, and makes 
her his queen in a sovereign act of 
imagination. Wryly commenting 
on his own penchant for creating 
female literary characters who lean 
more toward male sexual fantasy 
than in the direction of plausible 
mimesis, Jodha is “perfectly atten-
tive . . . undemanding . . . endlessly 
available,” in short, “a fantasy of 
perfection” (46). Jodha’s imaginary 
status, however, has no bearing on 
her independent existence: like his 
other wives, she has her own quar-
ters, servants, and plays cards with 
the emperor. “He gave her a name, 
Jodha, and no man dared gainsay 
him” (27). In this formulation, 
Rushdie suggests that ontology is 
as much a matter of power—and 
fear of violence—as it is of evi-
dence. As the stories of Jodha and 
Qara Köz unfold, however, fi ctions 
persistently exceed the bounds of 
their origins and their authors. The 
question of a character’s indepen-
dent existence and free will becomes 
a metonym for theological inquiry: 
“[I]f God turned his face away from 
his creation, Man, would Man sim-
ply cease to be?” (49). Akbar, prefi g-
uring Benedict Anderson, imagines 
Mughal Hindustan into existence by 
commissioning a massive series of 
paintings; he similarly commissions 
a new folio to canonize the lost prin-
cess Qara Köz and restore her to 
the historical record. 
 After enchanting the emperor and 
much of Sikri for years, Niccolò’s 
wistful assertion that time operates 
according to different laws in  Mun-
dus Novus (thus making it possible 
for Qara Köz to stop time and for 
Niccolò to be her son) founders on 
the rocks of Akbar’s pragmatism. 
In Akbar’s retelling of the story, 
Niccolò is not Qara Köz’s son, but 
the product of an incestuous union 
between Ago and his own daughter, 
born to him by Qara Köz’s servant 
and “mirror.” For rather obscure 
reasons, the revelation of incest sig-
nals the end, both literally and fi g-
uratively. Whereas Akbar considers 
adopting Niccolò as his honorary 
son in the  jouissance of the might-
have-been, when the deferral of 
narrative ends, Akbar bans Niccolò 
from court, the lake ensuring the 
survival of the city of Fatehpur 
Sikri vanishes, and the novel closes 
with Akbar contemplating his own 
incestuous union with Qara Köz, 
who appears to him as a kind of 
material apparition summoned by 
the emperor’s sovereign imagina-
tion. To put it another way, Akbar 
refuses Niccolò’s particular alternate 
version of history but subscribes—as 
does Rushdie—to similar ontologi-
cal commitments that pluralize “a” 
historical record, seeing it as a text 
open to continuous revision and 
artistic appropriation. Dismissing 
Niccolò’s story, Akbar seizes its 
character, bearing her back with 
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him across the permeable bound-
ary between the fi ctive and the real. 
The story-within-a-story structure 
thus imbeds and rejects Niccolò’s 
speculative genealogy in the very act 
of affi rming Rushdie’s own quite 
similar conscription of historical 
fi gures, leaving the status of the nov-
el’s enabling conceit—the synchro-
nous narrative history—ultimately 
unstable. 
 Not only has  The Enchantress of 
Florence divorced humanism from 
classicism, by depicting the encoun-
ter with fi ction through the lens 
of enchantment, Rushdie’s novel 
severs the links between secularism 
and its traditional allies: skepticism, 
reason, and dispassionate analysis. 
Sikri and Florence are thus human-
ist and secular in the limited senses 
described previously, but they are 
strikingly not places where the 
retreat of religion parallels a fading 
of what Charles Taylor and others 
call the enchanted world of a pre-
secular imagination. In fact, these 
worlds are secular, humanist, and 
modern to the extent that they are 
novelistic. The rejection of militant 
religiosity does not entail or require 
a commensurate rejection of magic 
and credulity, nor does it imply 
an epistemological shift away from 
an attitude of belief toward one of 
skepticism. For far too long, schol-
ars of the novel have abetted the 
project of solidifying a tenuous 
equivalence between the novel as 
a genre and secularization as a 
normative project.  The Enchantress 
of Florence presents a decidedly 
nonsecular atheism, a modernity 
divorced from rationalism, and a 
vision of the encounter with fi ction 
as enchantment rather than the will-
ing suspension of disbelief. Despite 
its platitudes and pomposity,  The 
Enchantress of Florence helps us to 
see why claims for the inherent sec-
ularism of the novel as a genre 
will teach us little about either sec-
ularism or the novel; the novel can 
instead assist in the effort to theorize 
secularism, modernity, and human-
ism beyond the modes of reason and 
the affects of disenchantment. 
 —Yale University 
